|
||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||
BMI's Executive Summary[TOP] In Q407 Iran's defence and security situation remained fraught with difficulties. The overriding issue remained the country's conflict with the US, the EU, and to a lesser extent with other members of the UN Security Council over its nuclear programme. As a result of Tehran's failure to demonstrate to the UN that its nuclear weapons programme was entirely peaceful it faced two sets of UN sanctions imposed since late 2006, with the possibility of a third under discussion. These sanctions coupled with poor economic policies and renewed signs of internal strife within the ruling groups in the Islamic Republic all contributed to a degree of potentially dangerous internal volatility. Nevertheless, we conclude that Tehran retains a tight lid on domestic unrest and is unlikely to face military action from either the US or Israel (the only two potential aggressors) for the moment, particularly as the US is occupied by the situation in Iraq and its own looming 2008 election campaign. In a mixed and sometimes confusing picture there were nevertheless some positive signs. They included indications that the pragmatic factions in Iran's leadership were rallying their forces. Iran also appeared to have quietly agreed to cool its support for insurgent groups in neighbouring Iraq. And the latest intelligence in Washington suggested that despite its aggressive posturing the country may have actually stopped its nuclear weapons programme as far back as 2003, although it retained the capacity to re-start the enrichment process. These indications however co-existed with less encouraging ones, such as the appointment of a new, intransigent nuclear negotiator and President Ahmadinejad's continuing intransigence. We expect this interplay of light and shade to continue throughout most of 2008, although as we say our central hypothesis is that both Washington and Tehran will draw back from the brink of military confrontation. In terms of its defence industry, Iran has the capability to supply its own armed forces, and any other armed group, with significant military hardware. Whilst state investment in the Iranian defence industry remains almost unheard of given a range of international sanctions, non-state actors do not face the same restrictions. This became apparent in the types of weapons being used by Hezbollah during the recent conflict with Israel. Whilst Iran seems to be most at risk from confrontational Western foreign policies, it may in fact be internal Iranian politics that unravels President Ahmadinejad's current course. From day one the President has faced opposition from the higher echelons of power, who have been feared that his populist domestic policies and defiant foreign policies would cause splits and disunity in the existing centres of power. The internal political dimension may end up being the most prominent in 2008. |
||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||
Contents[TOP] Chapter 1 - Executive SummarySWOT Analysis Iran Political SWOT Iran Security SWOT Iran Defence Industry SWOT Iran Economic SWOT Iran Business Environment SWOT Chapter 2 - Political OverviewInternal Political Outlook The Rise Of The Revolutionary Guards New Election Bill Draft Sees Role for Basij Return Of The Pragmatists? Electing The Assembly Of Experts Rising Power Of The Revolutionary Guards Ethnic Tensions Potential Challenges To The Status Quo The Enemy Within? External Political Outlook An Injection of Realism? Diplomacy Continues Talks To Go On Risk Of Sanctions Compromising On Suspension? The US Steps In Hezbollah 'Victory' Bolsters Iran Iran And The Lebanese Crisis Iranian And Hezbollah Connections Kurdish Questions Deeper Issues At Stake Turkey Unlikely To Cross Border, But Iran May Chapter 3 - Security Risk AnalysisBMI’s Security Ratings Risk Ratings Table: Iran Regional Risk Ratings Table: State Terrorism Vulnerability Index Regional Security: The Middle East and North Africa Inter-State Conflicts Internal Conflicts Iran Security Risk Ratings Conflict Risk Terrorism Risk Physical Safety Risk Chapter 4 - Security OverviewInternal Security Situation Table: Insurgent Groups MKO Kurds Sunni Islamist Extremists Iraq United States Israel Persian Gulf Chapter 5 - Military Structure & Defence IndustryArmed Forces Table: Regional Armed Forces (including conscripted) 2006 Current Strength Historical Strength Equipment International Deployments Table: Iran Foreign Deployments Weapons Of Mass Destruction Delivery Vehicles Market Overview Arms Trade Overview Imports Exports Industry Trends & Developments Table: Key Players – Iran Defence Sector Procurement Trends & Developments Chapter 6 - Industry Forecast ScenarioTable: Iran Defence Sector – Army Enlargements Table: Iran Armed Forces Table: Iran Defence Sector – Government Expenditure Key Risks To BMI’s Forecast Scenario Chapter 7 - Macroeconomic ForecastTable: Economic Activity Chapter 8 - Company ProfilesProfiles – Indigenous Manufacturers Defence Industries Organisation (DIO) Aerospace Industries Organisation (AIO) Ammunition Industries Group (AMIG) Integrated Electronics Industries (IEI) Profiles - Foreign Manufacturers China Great Wall Industries Corporation Sukhoi Ulan-Ude Aviation Plant Chapter 9 - BMI Forecast ModellingHow we generate our industry forecasts Defence Industry Sources Chapter 10 - Appendix A: Risk Ratings MethodologyConflict Risk Methodology Terrorism Risk Methodology Physical Safety Risk Methodology Overall Risk Rating State Vulnerability Index
|
||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||
Competitive Landscape for MEA Defence & Security: Sample of
|
||||||||||||||||
Network of Defence & Security Sources[TOP] BMI's Middle East & Africa Defence & Security Reports are based on an extensive network of multilateral organisations, government departments, automotive industry associations, chambers of commerce and company reports. Information sources include: |
||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||
