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BMI's Executive Summary[TOP] The security situation in Iraq began to get better – or more accurately, become less bad – during Q407. There was a clear reduction in levels of violence, although the overall situation as far as the safety of the civilian population and the rule of law was concerned remained arguably one of the bleakest anywhere in the world. At the end of November 2007, US sources said that the total number of attacks across Iraq had fallen by 55% since the 'surge' in US troop strength reached its high-water mark of 30,000 extra troops in June. Overall civilian deaths calculated by the Iraqi authorities fell consecutively in each of the three months to November. In October they had totalled 758, compared to 1,971 in January. US military deaths were in their fifth month of a downward trend in October at 38, compared to 126 in May. A variety of factors were credited for the improvement. The 'surge' had brought US forces out of their strongholds to patrol more visibly on a local level. Rebel groups had begun to fragment and fight between themselves. In the south the Shi'ite Mahdi Army was continuing to observe a ceasefire. Syria and Iran, two neighbours generally hostile to the US project in Iraq, had nevertheless appeared to collaborate, making it more difficult for foreign jihadists to enter the country and join the ranks of the insurgency. There were some early signs that the Iranians were cutting back weapons supplies to the insurgents. The US effort to recruit mainly Sunni militants into unofficial 'neighbourhood security' patrols seemed to be paying off. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki faces significant challenges if he is to take advantage of this window of opportunity and press ahead with political moves to build reconciliation between the country's different ethnic communities and political factions. Prospects on this front were not terribly encouraging. Extensive disputes over Iraq's constitution amongst the Shi'a, Sunni and Kurdish population, especially concerning oil-revenue sharing arrangements, remained unsolved. Various draft laws on these issues were deadlocked and seemed unlikely to progress quickly. Despite the improvements, nobody expects to see an end to the violence any time soon. Similarly, not many people expect Iraqi security forces to take full responsibility for the whole country at any time soon, nor for the coalition forces to withdraw from the country on any large scale. Finally, with almost all military equipment entering the country through donations or at least at 'gifted' prices, any talk of establishing a functioning defence industry in Iraq will remain premature for the foreseeable future. |
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Contents[TOP] Chapter 1 - Executive SummarySWOT Analysis Iraq Political SWOT Iraq Security SWOT Iraq Defence Industry SWOT Chapter 2 - Political OverviewDomestic Political Outlook New National Unity Government Militias Consolidate Their Power, Creating Further Risks Row Over Oil Rights Kirkuk Will Be A Key Flashpoint Zarqawi's Death: No Lasting Blow To Insurgency A Fragmented Insurgency: The Complex Reality Motivations for Insurgents Persist Zarqawi's Role Has Long Been Overstated The Economic Impact of Violence Foreign Policy Lebanon Crisis: An In-Depth Look At The Impact On Iraq Very Different Priorities Sistani's Ceasefire Call At Odds With US An Issue That Unites Sunni And Shi'a? Iran Tensions Another Source Of Strain Chapter 3 - Security Risk AnalysisBMI’s Security Ratings Risk Ratings Table: Regional Risk Ratings Table: State Terrorism Vulnerability Index Regional Security: The Middle East and North Africa 19 Inter-State Conflicts Internal Conflicts Iraq Conflict Risk Iraq Terrorism Risk Iraq Physical Safety Risk Chapter 4 - Security OverviewInternal Threats Table: Iraq Insurgent Groups Over 100 Deaths A Day: Violence Worsens More Kidnappings, But Fewer Foreigners Abducted Violence Worst In Baghdad Disillusionment Several Insurgencies Foreign Military Presence: No Clear End In Sight The Killings Continue Deterioration In Basra External Threats Kurdish Questions Turkey Unlikely To Cross Border, But Iran May Chapter 5 - Military Structure & Defence IndustryArmed Forces Table: Regional Armed Forces (including conscripted) 2006 Current Strength Historical Strength Weapons of Mass Destruction Market Overview Arms Trade Overview Procurement Trends & Developments Chapter 6 - Industry Forecast ScenarioTable: Iraq Defence Sector - Historical Data & Forecasts Key Risks To BMI’s Forecast Scenario Chapter 7 - Macroeconomic ForecastTable: Iraq - Economic Activity Chapter 8 - Company ProfilesDabin Group Chapter 9 - BMI Forecast ModellingHow we generate our industry forecasts Defence Industry Sources Chapter 10 - Appendix A: Risk Ratings MethodologyConflict Risk Methodology Terrorism Risk Methodology Physical Safety Risk Methodology Overall Risk Rating State Vulnerability Index
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Competitive Landscape for MEA Defence & Security: Sample of
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Network of Defence & Security Sources[TOP] BMI's Middle East & Africa Defence & Security Reports are based on an extensive network of multilateral organisations, government departments, automotive industry associations, chambers of commerce and company reports. Information sources include: |
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