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BMI's Executive Summary[TOP] The start of President Felipe Calderón's six-year presidency in December 2006 was inauspicious: with a narrow and contested victory in the elections six months earlier the new leader faced the bitter opposition of Mexico's left wing parties and lacked a majority in Congress. However, one year on, at the tail end of 2007, Calderón had surprised even his strongest critics by moving forward with tax and other reforms. One of his most popular decisions was taken right at the beginning, when the President brought the armed forces into the struggle against Mexico's powerful and murderous drug cartels. Early results on this front helped his standing in the opinion polls: some leading drug bosses were arrested or extradited to the US, and by late 2007 the security services were making record drug seizures. Cocaine prices in the US rose to a five-year high, reflecting a tightening of supply caused by the crackdown in Mexico. While the situation was clearly encouraging, and persuaded Washington to throw its support behind a US$8.4bn three-year Mexican drugs control programme, BMI warns that the drugs business remains resilient, and that most politicians who have proclaimed victory in the 'war against drugs' have been proven wrong. A source of concern was the re-emergence of a dormant and little-known guerrilla group in central Mexico, the Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR), which in mid-2007 launched a series of highly damaging bomb attacks on natural gas pipelines, causing significant economic losses. The EPR appeared motivated by the presumed kidnapping of two of its members, and apart from this specific issue was not thought to be seeking to mount a major challenge to the new government. However, the way it had managed to keep 'under the radar' of the intelligence services, and the strength of the blow it delivered to the pipeline infrastructure, highlighted a significant security weakness. Mexico maintains a small defence industry focusing mainly on the production of small arms and ammunition. Efforts to achieve a degree of self-sufficiency through co-operation with foreign firms floundered as a result of the economic difficulties of the early 1980s. Since then, Mexico has relied mainly on foreign, and in particular US, arms manufacturers for its large-scale weapons systems requirements. Given that the US security guarantees against external threats, Mexico has never needed a very large army. The armed forces are, however, in need of modernisation – Mexico's army has no battle tanks in its inventory. Mexican armed forces continue to monitor rebel enclaves and strongholds, mounting occasional 'search and destroy' missions and making arrests; generally, however, there is a stalemate. Regardless of the internal protests Mexico can rely on US support, political and military, to assist with security issues: good news given the condition of Mexico's defence industry. |
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Contents[TOP] Chapter 1 - Executive SummarySWOT Analysis Mexico Political SWOT Mexico Security SWOT Mexico Defence Industry SWOT Mexico Economic SWOT Mexico Business Environment SWOT Chapter 2 - Political OverviewDomestic Political Outlook Calderón Victorious – AMLO Defiant Challenges Ahead Foreign Policy Ready For Reform Chapter 3 - Security Risk AnalysisBMI’s Security Ratings Risk Ratings Table: Regional Risk Ratings Table: State Terrorism Vulnerability Index Regional Security: Latin America US-Latin America Relations Regional Arms Race Narcotics And Security Mexico Security Risk Rating Mexico Conflict Risk Mexico Terrorism Risk Mexico Physical Safety Risk Chapter 4 - Security OverviewInternal Security Situation Gangs and the Drug Trade External Security Situation Mexico-US Relations Al-Qaeda Chapter 5 - Military Structure & Defence IndustryArmed Forces Table: Regional Armed Forces (including conscripted) 2006 US-Mexican Military Co-Operation Market Overview Arms Trade Overview Imports Industry Trends And Developments Procurement Trends And Developments Chapter 6 - Industry Forecast ScenarioTable: Mexico Defence & Security Industry – Historical Data & Forecasts Table: Mexico Defence & Security Industry – Historical Data & Forecasts Key Risks To Forecast Scenario Chapter 7 - Macroeconomic ForecastAuto Sector Drives Up Forecasts Table: Economic Activity Indicators Chapter 8 - Company ProfilesHoneywell Aerospace Productos Mendoza SA Chapter 9 - BMI Forecast ModellingHow We Generate Our Industry Forecasts Defence Industry Sources Chapter 10 - Appendix A: Risk Ratings MethodologyConflict Risk Methodology Terrorism Risk Methodology Physical Safety Risk Methodology Overall Risk Rating State Vulnerability Index Methodology
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Competitive Landscape for Latin America Defence & Security: Sample of
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* Astilleros y Maestranzas de la Armada * Embraer * Empresa Nacional de Aeronautica de Chile |
* Honeywell Aerospace * Lockheed Martin Argentina (LMAASA) |
[TOP]
BMI's Latin America Defence & Security Reports are based on an extensive network of multilateral organisations, government departments, automotive industry associations, chambers of commerce and company reports. Information sources include:
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