BMI's Executive Summary

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The beginnings of a potential turn in Syria's diplomatic and defence positioning in the Middle East began to be seen in Q407. At the end of the preceding quarter an Israeli air strike on unidentified Syrian facilities – rumoured to be part of some kind of North Korean-supported nuclear programme – appeared to point to more of the same old strategic isolation for the country, as part of an 'axis of evil' (in Bushspeak) or, alternatively as an uncompromising anti-Zionist pole (Ahmadinejad-speak). Yet to the contrary, no sooner had the dust settled on the military action than a process of rapprochement began. A key milestone was Washington's decision to invite Syria to participate in the opening of the Middle East peace conference held in Annapolis on November 27 and 28. The US government changed the agenda, to formally include the Israeli-Syria Golan Heights dispute, so as to secure Syrian participation. In a separate but also significant initiative, Russia said it was planning a separate mediating role in early 2008 to promote Israel-Syria negotiations over the Heights.

A series of other developments contributed to the diplomatic opening. US military leaders in Iraq acknowledged in Q407 that the flow of jihadists from across the Syrian border – volunteer fighters who join the anti-US insurgency – had begun to dwindle. While Syria's interventionist stance in Lebanese politics had not fundamentally changed, a number of Western governments hailed what they saw as a new willingness to act as a moderating influence and broker a deal on the Lebanese presidency. The Wall Street Journal quoted a 'senior Israeli official' in November saying that 'this is one of those moments in history where the Syrians have been given an opportunity to jump. If they do jump, they will be embraced'. One motive behind these moves was said to be Washington's desire to drive a wedge between Syria and Iran, as part of its ongoing strategy of isolating the Tehran government. Damascus in the meantime seemed to be welcoming the new diplomatic opening without giving up any of its key foreign policy positions, including its alliance with Tehran and its support for Hizbullah in Lebanon.

The Syrian armed forces have declined in terms of both capabilities and equipment of late, as US sanctions and subsequent cash shortfalls have forced the government to reduce its military spending. Military expenditure in Syria is low, having not increased in recent years. Syria lacks an established indigenous defence industry of significance, and its armed forces are almost entirely dependent upon procurement from overseas. This reliance has led to the Syrian armed forces being left under-equipped and reliant on obsolete, ageing equipment, with the government unable to procure modern hardware due to economic restrictions and internationally imposed arms trade sanctions. This scenario is unlikely to change in the near future given Syria's weak economy and current poor relations with the majority of the international community. However, a recently signed strategic accord with Iran could see financial and technological investment in the Syrian defence industry. Syrian arms imports generally originate from anti-US states such as North Korea and Iran, while other suppliers are very limited given the extensive embargoes placed upon states exporting arms to Syria. The re-emergence of Russia as a potential supplier

Chapter 1 - Executive Summary

SWOT Analysis

Syria Political SWOT

Syria Security SWOT

Syria Defence Industry SWOT

Chapter 2 - Political Overview

Domestic Political Outlook

Democratise Like An Egyptian?

Kurds And Way Forward

Chapter 3 - Foreign Relations

Difficult Decisions For al-Assad

What Could Syria Do?

Syria Has A Lot To Lose

The US Has Much To Offer If It Chooses

Could Damascus Break Away From Tehran?

Chapter 4 - Security Risk Ratings

BMI’s Security Ratings

Risk Ratings

Table: Syria Regional Security Ratings

Table: State Terrorism Vulnerability Index

Regional Security: The Middle East and North Africa

Inter-State Conflicts

Internal Conflicts

Syria Security Risk Ratings

Syria Conflict Risk

Syria Terrorism Risk

Syria Physical Safety Risk

Chapter 5 - Security Risk Overview

External Security Situation

US Regional Presence

Israel

Turkey And Jordan

Lebanon

Internal Security Situation

Jund al-Sham

Islamist Revival?

Washington Thanks Damascus

Chapter 6 - Military Structure & Defence Industry

Armed Forces

Table: Regional Armed Forces (including conscripted) 2006

Current Strength

International Deployments

Weapons Of Mass Destruction

Chapter 7 - Market Structure

Arms Trade Overview

Imports

Exports

Procurement Trends & Developments

Chapter 8 - Industry Forecast Scenario

Table: Syria Defence Sector – Historical Data & Forecasts

Mutual Assistance

Key Risks To BMI’s Forecast Scenario

Chapter 9 - Macroeconomic Forecast

Syria: Macroeconomic Data & Forecasts

Chapter 10 - BMI Forecast Modelling

How we generate our industry forecasts

Defence Industry

Sources

Chapter 11 - Appendix A: Risk Ratings Methodology

Conflict Risk Methodology

Terrorism Risk Methodology

Physical Safety Risk Methodology

Overall Risk Rating

State Vulnerability Index

Competitive Landscape for MEA Defence & Security: Sample of  
Companies Ranked

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Rankings and Competitive Landscapes by production and sales; market share and change on previous year; number of employees, ownership structure and year established. Also includes analysis of company expansion, export and investment strategies.

Network of Defence & Security Sources

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BMI's Middle East & Africa Defence & Security Reports are based on an extensive network of multilateral organisations, government departments, automotive industry associations, chambers of commerce and company reports. Information sources include: