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BMI's Executive Summary[TOP] In 2007 President Hugo Chávez continued to concentrate power and influence in Venezuela, and to a lesser degree in Latin America, pursuing a nationalist and anti-US policy. At home his position looked secure, based on popular support from Venezuela's poor, an overwhelming majority in Congress (the opposition boycotted the December 2006 elections), and wide-ranging executive powers. That said, a number of analysts note that the President's leadership style is based on provoking conflict and permanently casting himself in the role of rebel against Venezuela's perceived enemies, ranging from the US to the old ruling elite and 'traitors' to his cause. This style has not served him badly in the first eight years of his rule; but some would say it potentially carries within it the seed of his own destruction. Venezuela's armed forces are amongst the smallest in the region, but were traditionally technologically superior to many of its regional counterparts. However, this superiority is becoming increasingly insignificant. Venezuela plays little part in the world arms market. It imports nearly all its weapons, and in fact has almost no indigenous defence production capability. Venezuela's marked dependence on weapons imports has traditionally been somewhat offset by the diverse suppliers from which the country purchases its arms. Modernisation and upgrades under the new procurement programme are likely to be externally directed, with European and Middle Eastern countries expected to make up most of the suppliers. However, the overall increase in procurement could prove beneficial for the defence industry if co-operative or domestic bids are chosen for later contracts. Defence spending will increase over the forecast period as a result of high oil prices that have enabled the government to go on an arms procurement spending spree. However, in May 2006, the US imposed a ban on arms exports to Venezuela, having tried to stop the sale of military aircraft from Spain and Brazil that use US manufactured components. BMI believes that Hugo Chávez is here for a while yet. Chávez has dominated Venezuelan politics since his election in 1998. The anti-Chávez opposition movement has been deeply divided since the failed coup in 2002 and the subsequent failure to make a recall referendum stick. Venezuela is not likely to develop a competitive defence industry in the foreseeable future and will remain import-dependent for its weapons purchases and diverse in the sources it relies on for those purchases. |
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Contents[TOP] Chapter 1 - Executive SummarySWOT Analysis Venezuela Political SWOT Venezuela Security SWOT Venezuela Defence Industry SWOT Venezuela Economic SWOT Venezuela Business Environment SWOT Chapter 2 - Political OverviewDomestic Politics Still On Track Opposition To Unify? Oil Sector In Chávez' Sights Agribusiness And Mining Also Suffer External Political Outlook Rocky Road Ahead Chapter 3 - Security Risk AnalysisBMI’s Security Ratings Risk Ratings Table: Regional Risk Ratings Table: State Terrorism Vulnerability Index Regional Security: Latin America US-Latin America Relations Regional Arms Race Narcotics And Security Venezuela Security Risk Rating Venezuela Conflict Risk Venezuela Terrorism Risk Venezuela Physical Safety Risk Chapter 4 - Security OverviewInternal Security Situation Political Unrest External Security Situation Table: Venezuela Regional Insurgent Groups Regional Relations Venezuela-US Relations Chávez And Regional Solidarity Venezuela-Colombia Relations Venezuela-Vatican Relations Chapter 5 - Market Structure & Defence IndustryArmed Forces Table: Regional Armed Forces (including conscripted) 2006 Weapons of Mass Destruction International Deployment Market Overview Arms Trade Overview Imports Exports Industry Trends and Developments Procurement Trends & Developments Table: Comparison Of Military Equipment And Proposed Procurements Overview Of The 2005 Procurement Plan Russia A Key Player Chapter 6 - Industry Forecast ScenarioTable: Venezuela Defence Sector - Historical Data & Forecasts Army Enlargements Government Expenditure Key Risks To BMI’s Forecast Scenario Chapter 7 - Macroeconomic ForecastBooming Stagnation? Table: Economic Activity Indicators Chapter 8 - BMI Forecast ModellingHow we generate our industry forecasts Defence Industry Sources Chapter 9 - Appendix A: Risk Ratings MethodologyConflict Risk Methodology Terrorism Risk Methodology Physical Safety Risk Methodology Overall Risk Rating State Vulnerability Index Methodology
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Competitive Landscape for Latin America Defence & Security: Sample of
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* Astilleros y Maestranzas de la Armada * Embraer * Empresa Nacional de Aeronautica de Chile |
* Honeywell Aerospace * Lockheed Martin Argentina (LMAASA) |
[TOP]
BMI's Latin America Defence & Security Reports are based on an extensive network of multilateral organisations, government departments, automotive industry associations, chambers of commerce and company reports. Information sources include:
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